2021-01-01 11:57:48 -06:00
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---
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layout: default
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2021-01-01 17:37:07 -06:00
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title: 'Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper'
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date: '2008-10-31 18:10:00 UTC'
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2021-01-01 11:59:53 -06:00
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grand_parent: Emails
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2021-01-01 12:01:36 -06:00
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parent: Cryptography Mailing List
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2021-01-01 11:58:00 -06:00
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nav_order: 1
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2021-01-01 11:57:48 -06:00
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---
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2021-01-01 12:05:49 -06:00
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# Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper
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The email on the Cryptography Mailing List that announced Bitcoin publicly to the world.
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{: .fs-6 .fw-300 }
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2021-01-01 12:06:21 -06:00
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---
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2021-01-01 12:05:49 -06:00
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```
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I've been working on a new electronic cash system that's fully
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peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party.
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The paper is available at:
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http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
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The main properties:
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Double-spending is prevented with a peer-to-peer network.
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No mint or other trusted parties.
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Participants can be anonymous.
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New coins are made from Hashcash style proof-of-work.
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The proof-of-work for new coin generation also powers the
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network to prevent double-spending.
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Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
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Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would
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allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another
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without the burdens of going through a financial institution.
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Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main
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benefits are lost if a trusted party is still required to prevent
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double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending
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problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps
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transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based
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proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without
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redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as
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proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came
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from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as honest nodes control
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the most CPU power on the network, they can generate the longest
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chain and outpace any attackers. The network itself requires
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minimal structure. Messages are broadcasted on a best effort basis,
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and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the
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longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they
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were gone.
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Full paper at:
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http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
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Satoshi Nakamoto
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
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The Cryptography Mailing List
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Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com
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```
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