The activation is past and there is no point in having a flag passed
through a dozen methods in order to detect when to enable it.
Because it is always enabled.
This removes the transaction-signing code from the hub internal codebase.
The only user for this was the API call signrawtransaction,
and a lot of unit testing code.
I'd argue that if the user needs to send a private key to the hub via
RPC for signing his transaction, then they are doing it wrong.
This also removes the duplicate test double_spend which tests
functionality also tested in the DoubleSpendProofTest.
As an aside, the flowee/utils library still has full signing capability
and we suggest using the TransactionBuilder API for that.
People all over the Internet, including on the BCH spec, seem confused
about these enum values. They think they are opcodes.
So lets be clear and rename them to the thing they are. Placeholders or
a return-code.
Move the MutableTransactionSignatureChecker class out of the header and
thereby remove the need to include transaction.h in the header.
This checker was never used in any app, just in the unit tests.
This also fixes includes around.
This is part of the protocol upgrade for 2020-05-15, and in general it
seems to go the direction of "we did this before, lets do this again".
The spec is clear enough, but there is still a lack of questioning and
testing. The problem this attempts to fix has been neutered for years[1].
The spec states:
> The essential idea of SigChecks is to perform counting solely in the
> spending transaction, and count actual executed signature check
> operations.
This, however nobel and logical, ignores that the
check-for-being-too-costly just pulled in a UTXO lookup and the loading
of the output script from the historical chain.
The goal that we protect against CPU over-use may be reached, but the
price is a total system slowdown. You can have multiple CPUs, but the
bus to permanent storage has one, max 2 parallel pipes.
To ensure theHub stays the number one scalable node, I didn't blindly
follow the spec, while making sure that the Hub is correctly going to
follow/reject consensus violations of newly mined blocks.
As a result the implementation in Flowee the Hub:
* does not check sigcheck-counts on historical blocks (more than 1000
blocks in the past).
This may increase the risk of chain-splits ever so slightly, but the cost
of disk-IO would be too high.
* No longer stores the value in the mempool, nor uses it for the
CPU-miner.
* Ties the sigcheck-limits to the user-set block-size-accept-limit.
This is contrary to the spec which mistakenly thinks that BCH has a
max block-size in the consensus rules. The effect is the same, though.
* The per-intput standardness suggestion is not implemented because
standardness checks don't currently fetch the previous outputs and
that would be too expensive to add.
* Standardness rules for the whole transaction are moved to the
mempool-acceptance logic instead. The cost would be too great
otherwise, similar to the previous point.
Again, the effect is the same as likely intented.
---
1) since the intro of the CachingTransactionSignatureChecker
It was only called twice, and in very close proximity. The class didn't
add anything.
This improves readability and with the new state its easier to write
too.
tomFlowee
John Galt